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CASES NOTED
EVIDENCE - HOLDING AS A MATERIAL WITNESS IN
ORDER TO SECURE A CONFESSION
Defendant was committed to jail as a material witness in connec-
tion with a homicide He was subjected to protracted questioning for
five days, at the end of which time he confessed to the murder and
was arraigned. The trial court refused the defendant's request that the
attention of the jury be called to the statutory provision which requires
that a defendant be arraigned without unnecessary delay,' and also, that
the jury be informed of its right to consider any unnecessary delay in
arraignment in determining the voluntary character of the confession.
On appeal, held, that since the jury could not have found the commitment
to be unjustified, or a mere pretense, the requested charges were properly
refused. People v. Perez, 90 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 70 S.Ct.
483 (1950).
The mere fact that a defendant has been illegally detained by the
police has been ruled as not to bar the admission of a confession while
he was so held, 2 even though the purpose of the detention was to obtain
a confession.' The primary and the seemingly sole factor, as regards
the admissibility of a confession, is that it was voluntarily made. Involun-
tary confessions are excluded, not because of any illegality or immorality
in obtaining them, but because they are unreliable evidence. It must be
kept in mind, however, that in most jurisdictions a confession cannot
warrant a conviction without additional proof of the corpus deliciti.'
The instant case arose under a statute providing for the arraignment
of a suspect without any unnecessary delay.' Statutes to the same effect
have been enacted in many of the other states.7 Nevertheless, the courts,
while chastizing the police for such tactics, have held that illegal delay
in arraignment was not sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.8
Some courts have held that illegal delay in arraignment was only a fac-
tor to be weighed with others in determining whether a confession has
1. N.Y. CRIM. CODE OF PROC. § 165 (1887).
2. People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 153 P.2d 244 (1944); People v. Elmore, 227
N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451 (1938), People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934).
3. Dougherty v. State, 184- Ga. 537, 192 S.E. 223 (1937); People v. Alex, supra.
4. WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
S. People v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 592, 109 N.E. 618; N.Y. CIM. CODE OF PROC. § 395.
6. N.Y. CRIM. CODE OF PROC. § 165 ("The defendant must in all cases be taken
before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may give bail at any hour of
the day or night.")
7. See note I tupra; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943).
8. People v. Elmore, supra; People v. Alex, supra; People v. Kelly, 264 App. Div.
14, 35 N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 1942)i People v. Cohen, 24.3 App. Div. 245, 276 N.Y.
Supp. 851 (2d Dep't 1935); People v. Tybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E. 538 (1916). But cf.
People v. Thomlinson, 400 Ill. 555, 81 N.E.2d 434 (1948).
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any testimonial value.9 However, the coercion and threats which usually
accompany illegal commitment have caused a majority of the courts
to hold that the voluntary nature of the confession is a question of fact
for the jury, in the determination of which the jury should be informed
of the statutory provisions which govern the arraignment of a suspect.'
Thus trial courts have been reversed when the defendant was illegally
detained for a period as short as twenty-four hours, when the requested
charge as to the arraignment statutes was refused." In most cases of this
type the attendant evidence of lengthy periods of interrogations and
threats used by the police, while the defendant was illegally detained,
raised as a substantial issue the voluntary character of the confession.' 2
In McNabb v. United States," the Supreme Court set aside a conviction
of a lower federal court obtained in contravention of a federal arraign-
ment statute. 14 The Court, exercising its power to establish standards
of evidence in federal courts, held inadmissible a confession obtained
through protracted questioning while the defendant was illegally de-
tained. But since it cannot formulate rules of evidence in cases arising
at state level' 5 the court seized upon the "third degree" methods of
questioning, usually accompanying such confessions, as rendering them
involuntary and hence violative of due process of law. The duty of ob-
serving the constitutional rights of a defendant supersedes the rules of
state procedure; so that the requirements of due process of law limit
the freedom of the state in establishing policies of judicature.'6
In the instant case the detention of the defendant as a material
witness without benefit of friends or counsel afforded the police an oppor-
tunity to elicit a confession which undoubtedly would have been difficult
to extract had statutory provisions been observed. It is recognized that
the utility of obtaining confessions from hardened criminals by pro-
tracted and forceful questioning must be balanced against the rights of
the defendant. But in the instant case the rights of the defendant as
9. People v. Mummiani, 258 NY. 394-, 180 N.E. 94- (1932).
10. People v. Cohen, 266 App. Div. 23, 41 N.Y.S.2d 710 (3d Dep't 1943); Peo-
pie v. Richmond, 266 App. Div. 903, 42 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dep't 1943); Pe6ple v.
Alex, supra; People v. Kelly, supra; People v. Elmore, supra.
1t. People v. Cohen, supra note 81 People v. Kelly, supra.
12. People v. Valletutti, 291 N.Y. 276, 78 N.E.2d 485 (1948).
13. 318 U.S. 332 (1943); accord, Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948);
cj. Mitchell v. United States, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). See 3 MIAMI L. Q. 307 (1949).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 595. See also FED. R. CEiM. P. 5(a) (requiring arraignment with-
out unnecessary delay).
15. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)i Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)j Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629
(1940)3 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
16. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
CASES NOTED
guaranteed by the New York Constitution' 7 and statutes' 8 were needlessly
sacrificed to the ends of summary law enforcement, since his arraign-
ment as a material witness afforded the police an opportunity to keep him
in custody and thereby easily obtain a confession. When officers delay in
taking a defendant before a magistrate for the purpose of obtaining a
confession, they are in reality violating the constitutional provision that
"no courts save those provided for in this Constitution shall be estab-
lished."' It is submitted that a confession obtained by criminal means
should not be introduced into evidence, thereby denying a defendant the
specific protection afforded by statutes.
TORTS - WAIVER NOT PERMITTED TO EXTEND STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS WHERE LIBEL IS BASIS OF ACTION
An action was brought to recover from the defendant the proceeds of
a book which allegedly libeled the plaintiff. The one year statute of limi-
tations barred an action for recovery of damages for libel. Plaintiff brought
this action under the six year statute2 for money had and received. Held,
complaint dismissed. The remedy for libel does not embrace the right to
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit. Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d
871 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
In situations where an election of remedies is allowed, the effect of waiv-
ing the tort and suing in assumpsit is to make the "contract" statute of limi-
tations applicable.3 Since the election of remedies is not granted automatically
at the option of the plaintiff, the nature of the tort he chooses to waive is
important. Generally, a waiver has been permitted in cases of conversion, 4
deceit and fraud 5 to allow recovery from the defendant for anything which
had been taken from the plaintiff.6 Usually, however, the election is denied
in negligence7 and trespass,8 especially where there has been no benefit to
the defendant.
17. N.Y. CONST., Art. 1, § 6.
18. N.Y. CODE OF CRaM. PROC. § 165, 395.
19. Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 178 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Ky. 1943).
1. N.Y. CIVIL PPACTICE ACT § 51.
2. Id. at § 48.
3. Dougherty v. Norlin, 147 Kan. 565, 78 P.2d 65 (1938). But cf. Schlick v.
N.Y. Dugan Bros., Inc., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
4. See Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y. 161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890).
5. McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 527, 36 P.2d 642 (1934) j Addy v. Stewart,
69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949). But see Brevard County Bldg. & Loan v. Sumrall,
101 Fla. 1189, 1197, 133 So. 888, 891 (1931).
6. See Wilson v. Shrader, 79 S.E. 1083, 1086 (W.Va. 1913).
7. Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
8. Tightmeyer v. Mongold, 20 Kan. 90 (1875).
